Cloud security: A case study in telemedicine by Johnstone, Michael
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
ECU Publications 2012 
1-1-2012 
Cloud security: A case study in telemedicine 
Johnstone 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2012 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Originally published in the Proceedings of the 1st Australian eHealth Informatics and Security Conference, held on 
the 3rd-5th December, 2012 at Novotel Langley Hotel, Perth, Western Australia 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2012/96 
 42 
 
CLOUD SECURITY: A CASE STUDY IN TELEMEDICINE 
 
 
Michael  N.  Johnstone  
School o f Computer  and  Securi ty Science and ECU Secur i ty Research Inst i tu te  
Edith Co wan Universi ty,  Per th,  Western Austra l ia  
m.johnstone@ecu.edu.au  
 
 
Abstract  
Security as part of requirements engineering is now seen as an essential part of systems development in several 
modern methodologies.  Unfortunately, medical systems are one domain where security is seen as an impediment 
to patient care and not as an essential part of a system.  Cloud computing may offer a seamless way to allow 
medical data to be transferred from patient to medical practitioners, whilst maintaining security requirements.  
This paper uses a case study to investigate the use of cloud computing in a mobile application for Parkinson 
Disease.  It was found that functionality took precedence over security requirements and standards. 
. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are the core tenets of information security.  Therefore, it would be 
expected that software systems would consider these tenets as paramount, as software is fast becoming 
ubiquitous. This is especially important in safety-critical domains such as military, aerospace and medical 
systems.  Unfortunately, most software, according to Shostack and Stewart (2008), is insecure.   It is noted by 
Johnstone (2009) that this is due to the tension between functional requirements (as seen by a customer) and 
security requirements (which often are not).  Worse, Wysopal et al. (2007) suggest that security requirements 
are often omitted from requirements specifications altogether.   
Medical systems appear especially problematic as their primary focus is patient care and security is either 
assumed or ignored (Williams, 2008).  Several well-reported cases, such as Stanford Hospital’s loss of 20,000 
ER patient records (Moisse, 2011) and an Australian pathology laboratory’s loss of patient data (Caldwell and 
Earley, 2009), highlight the embarrassment and loss of trust that occurs when medical data is leaked (a breach of 
confidentiality).  Clearly the nature of the data and its intended use must determine which of the core tenets of 
information security would be applicable.  For a real-time heart-rate monitor in an operating theatre, both 
integrity and availability would be critical; confidentiality less so.  In an on-line web-based patient record input 
system, confidentiality and integrity would be dominant, with availability perhaps being not as important. 
According to a recent IBIS report (IBISWorld, 2012) health and allied systems are “poised to become 
Australia’s biggest industry division and employer well before 2050...In this division, superfast broadband will 
be vital in driving healthcare costs down by faster diagnostics, preventive health systems [and] partial self-
diagnostic services...” 
Software engineering as a discipline is still maturing, so it is not unreasonable that software development that 
focuses on security concerns is still in its infancy.  There is certainly evidence of an evolution from object-
orientation in the 1980s, component-based software engineering in the 1990s, service-oriented architectures in 
the 2000s to cloud computing now.  Given that cloud computing in its most basic form provides a façade for 
data storage and retrieval, it can provide seamless access to data which could make data management simpler 
and thus potentially improve information technology security management, especially as both patients and 
medical practitioners make increased use of wireless transmission of data and Internet-based applications. 
This paper describes the issues involved with medical systems and the concomitant standards that apply to the 
development and use of such systems, explains the theory behind cloud computing and how this may benefit 
medical systems, uses a case study to illustrate the effectiveness of cloud-based data storage and retrieval for 
medical data and concludes by considering some security weaknesses of cloud computing. 
SECURITY STANDARDS AND MEDICAL SYSTEMS 
Mizukura et al. (2009) proposed a home health care network based on the IEEE 11073 standard.  ISO/IEEE 
11073 is actually a family of health informatics standards, for example, 11073-10407 specifies the behaviour of 
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blood pressure monitors.  Mizukura et al. field-tested a health monitoring application that was designed to 
capture heath data from elderly patients in their own environment and transmit such data across a network to 
relevant medical practitioners. 
Significant progress has been made on issues related to how to transfer medical data.  For example, ISO/IEEE 
11073-20601 (2010, p1) defines an abstract model of personal health data as well as the appropriate transport 
independent transfer grammar required to set up logical connections between systems.  Such standards are being 
implemented by manufacturers of telemedical equipment (see, for example, Biotronik, 2011). 
ISO 27799 (2008) recognises the problem and states “The need for effective IT security management in 
healthcare is made all the more urgent by the increasing use of wireless and Internet technologies in healthcare 
delivery. If not implemented properly, these complex technologies will increase the risks to the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of health information.” 
ISO 27799 provides guidance about what sort of health data needs to be protected, but like many standards, is 
descriptive, rather than prescriptive.  For example, it declares that personal health information (such as that 
collected by the iPad app described later in the case study) needs to be protected, but does not specify the 
precise means of protection that would meet the standard. 
HL7 V2 is an OSI level 7 (hence the name) ANSI standard protocol for communication between health service 
providers in Australia.  It offers security checks, participant identification, availability checks, negotiating 
exchange mechanism negotiation and provides a standard data structure.  Whilst HL7 messages are text-based 
(and thus perhaps lend themselves to encoding in XML and transmission via SOAP), the HL7 protocol does 
support the transfer of picture data via Base64 encoding of the binary data stream.  Whilst there is a clearly 
defined structure or ontology for HL7 messages, there is no innate formatting or defined dependency between 
the data in the observation (OBX) segments of a results message. 
HL7 supports the encoding of patient identifiers, provider identifiers and observations (medical test results), 
whilst at the lowest level, recognises message start and end identifiers as well as individual unique message 
identifiers (to ensure that collisions do not occur) and acknowledgments (although it is more correct to say that 
an HL7-compliant application recognises the message identifiers and processes them accordingly). 
Having examined some of the relevant standards and protocols for the transmission and storage of medical data, 
it is now appropriate to discuss how those data could be stored using cloud-based services. 
CLOUD COMPUTING 
As mentioned previously, cloud computing represents an evolution in the provision of software services, rather 
than a revolution.  However, as with any “new” concept, there is sometimes confusion as to what it actually 
represents and what benefits might accrue from the use of such technology.  In this section cloud computing is 
defined, the architecture of a cloud-based system explained and various models of cloud computing are 
discussed. 
Conventionally, cloud computing appears to be focussed on large-scale storage of information across multiple 
servers.  NIST (Mell and Grance, 2011, p2) provide a succinct definition of cloud computing that encompasses 
more than just distributed storage, viz: “…a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction”. 
Badger et al. (2012) claim that cloud computing has essential characteristics that differentiate it from earlier 
models of distributed computing, viz: on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid 
elasticity and measured service. 
NIST (Badger et al., 2012) also suggest a range of service and deployment models that provide coverage of the 
cloud computing landscape.  The service models include not only the familiar software as a service (SaaS), but 
also platform as a service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a service (IaaS).  PaaS encompasses software platforms 
(such as .NET), database engines and operating systems.  IaaS provides CPUs, virtualisation (if required) and 
block storage.  An example architecture is shown in figure 1.  Clearly, one of the main advantages of a multi-
layered architecture is the ability to fine-tune resource pooling in the middle layers to effect a change in 
performance without the service user being aware of the change (apart from the observed performance boost).  
Whilst resource pooling is usually a benefit as it provides redundancy, it will be shown in a later section that 
there are security implications with the complex architectures that are used to deliver cloud services. 
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Figure 1: Clould Computing Architecture (adapted from Zhang et al., 2010). 
 
The deployment models proposed by Badger et al. (2012, p2-2) are private, community, public and hybrid 
clouds.  Clearly, a private cloud exists for the use of one consumer (business) exclusively.  The cloud may be 
used by many business units within the same enterprise but the service provision may, in fact, be outsourced to a 
third party (which is likely and therefore the infrastructure is also likely to be remote from the consumer).  A 
community cloud is similar except that the consumer in this case is a group of interested parties that are not 
from the same enterprise.  The service may be managed by one of the parties in the community or by a third 
party.  A hybrid cloud, as the name implies, can use a combination of any of the three aforementioned 
deployment models.  The models remain distinctive but are linked by standards or proprietary systems that 
permit data and/or application portability. 
Having defined cloud computing and discussed various service and deployment models in general, what follows 
is a case study which uses cloud-based services to share medical data between interested parties.  
 
A PARKINSON DISEASE iPAD APP: A CASE STUDY 
The scope for this system was to provide a proof-of-concept iPad application (app) that allowed patients with 
Parkinson Disease to perform several tests which provide diagnostic information and allow the test results to be 
shared with a neurologist, hence facilitating management of the disease.  The major benefit is that patient does  
not need to travel to see their neurologist to perform the tests.  Given that a large proportion of patients are in the 
70-79 age group (Brown, 2002), the ability for the system to link to a neurologist and transfer data seamlessly 
was a prime requirement.  By conforming to Apple’s Human Interface Guidelines, it was expected that this 
requirement could be met, provided that the cloud services could be implemented for an iPad.  Figure 2 and 
figure 3 show some sample screen shots of the app. 
The basic requirements were to provide an app that allows a patient to perform two diagnostic tests, allow one 
or more of those tests to be saved and stored locally, to provide summary statistics and relevant graphical 
feedback to a patient so that s/he may track his/her progress and (critically for this discussion on information 
security) allow the sharing of patient data between one or more parties (usually the patient’s neurologist) in a 
seamless and transparent way. 
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Figure 2: Sample Test from the Parkinson Disease Tester App. 
 
Cloud computing was deemed to be a potential solution to the last requirement.  The sharing requirement had to 
allow a patient to send a share message to another iPad user, for the second user to respond in the affirmative (or 
negative) to allow the transfer of patient data and for the first user to have the ability to rescind the original 
sharing request and thus break the connection.  Several cloud providers were investigated including iCloud, 
Google, Nuvolabase and Moai.  iCloud was an obvious first choice as the target device was an iPad, but this 
service is meant to be a personal cloud service used across many devices.  It is not designed for sharing files 
with multiple users.  The other cloud services were evaluated, the result being that the Moai cloud, despite being 
targeted at the gaming community, met all of the functional requirements and thus was selected as the cloud 
service for this application.   
The app works by storing local data using SQLite (chosen because it doesn’t require a database server), the data 
is stored in the cloud as a JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) file and accessed using RESTful services 
(common to most Web applications).  JSON is a text-based standard (see RFC 4627) for defining and sending 
structured data between a Web application and a server.  JSON provides the usual data types (number, string, 
Boolean, array and object).  A JSON structure for the iPad app test data object is: 
 
"test": [ 
        { 
"type": "spiral", 
"number": "20", 
 “date”: “20121009”, 
 “value-array”, [4,6,5,3,3,7] 
        }, 
        { 
"type": "countdown", 
"number": "6" 
 “date”: “20121009”, 
 “value”: “13” 
        } 
    ] 
In this structure there are two types of test and whilst they share some common data elements such as a test 
number and a test date, the actual results are different.  JSON is able to characterise these different structures 
easily and thus is a good choice for representing the ontology of a test. 
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Figure 3: Sample Output from the Parkinson Disease Tester App. 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Considering cloud computing in its simplest (conventional) incarnation, which of distributed file storage and 
retrieval, there are several aspects of confidentiality, integrity and availability that are worth discussing.  If 
patient data is stored unencrypted on a cloud-based file system this would appear, at first glance, to be a breach 
of confidentiality as the file is stored in plain text (plain text in this context does not necessarily refer to ASCII 
text, but to any non-encrypted form of data, for example human-readable XML records, Microsoft Word 
documents or the data referred to in the case study).  Confidentiality is maintained by two means.  First, the user 
does not know which physical location stores the data and second, the data may be split into several parts across 
several locations.  The semblance of a single file is maintained by the cloud façade as part of SaaS (as shown in 
figure 1).  Integrity appears problematic by virtue of the benefits which assure confidentiality, that is, the 
separation of the file into multiple parts across multiple locations.  Provided that the PaaS layer is intact, the 
marshalling of the file from its parts into a whole is transparent to an end-user of the cloud.  Availability is, of 
course, handled by the IaaS layer. 
This describes the scenario where all of the components of cloud computing work seamlessly to provide the 
services expected of them.  From a security perspective, it is worth examining how standard attacks on 
confidentiality, integrity and availability might affect the provision of cloud services.  A standard attack on 
availability is denial-of-service (DoS).  Figure 4 indicates an alarming trend.  DoS attacks are increasing, not in 
complexity, but in their size.  This means that a DoS attack on a cloud service provider will almost certainly 
result in a loss of availability.  The wider problem is that the outcome of a DoS attack may affect integrity if a 
file is partially constructed.  There may be the opportunity for the data to be modified or for data to be leaked (a 
breach of confidentiality) because of a failure in the other service provision layers. 
Turning now to the specifics of the case study, a well-trodden mitigation pathway for problems of 
confidentiality is encryption.  Certainly the data being transferred from an iPad to the Moai cloud could be 
encrypted before transmission from a patient’s iPad and storage and decrypted on retrieval on a neurologist’s 
iPad.  Whether a public key infrastructure or private keys are chosen is perhaps not an issue as long as the key 
length prohibits the data being compromised during its effective lifetime, notwithstanding the key transmission 
safety issues inherent in the sharing of private keys.  Integrity issues are often dealt with by the use of cyclic 
redundancy checks or hashing.  Both techniques are feasible with the data being transferred from the iPad to the 
cloud.  It requires that the PaaS layer be capable of forming and sending a re-transmission request if data were 
found to be corrupt.  Availability issues appear the most insoluble in this scenario because of the ease by which 
DoS attacks can be mounted.  It is possible that IPv6, with its significantly larger address space (as compared to 
IPv4) may provide a successful mitigation strategy. 
 
Rather than using JSON as the messaging format, HL7 could provide a better alternative.  One possible mapping 
of an observation or OBX record (diagnostic test result) equivalent to the aforementioned JSON representation 
is: 
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OBX-2 (Value type) NM     // a number 
OBX-3 (Observation ID) 6^Countdown^LN  // the type of test 
OBX-5 (numeric) 13     // the actual value 
OBX-6 (units) s^Seconds^ISO+    // units of the value 
OBX-14 (date/time of observation) 20121009+1000 
 
On its own, the use of HL7 over JSON does not appear to provide significant benefits.  In terms of message 
transfer between a patient and a neurologist the overheads for HL7 are greater but there are some security 
advantages as mentioned in a previous section.  Remembering that the app is designed to share data in a one-to-
many relationship, the real benefit to using HL7 is realised when several health care providers wish to share data 
about the same patient.  In this scenario, using a common protocol designed for health data makes the translation 
and interpretation of the data relatively straightforward. 
The benefit of the cloud in terms of hiding the physical location/structure of the file becomes problematic when 
confidentiality is breached at the lower levels of the cloud architecture (figure 1).  This is largely because, 
especially in a hybrid deployment, multiple stakeholders across multiple domains may share physical data 
space.  In contrast to a more conventional model of data storage where a stakeholder has access to contiguous 
space, in the shared (cloud) space, parts of files may be juxtaposed with data from other stakeholders.  This 
leads to questions about effective access controls and authentication mechanisms at the higher levels of the 
cloud architecture.  The implementation of such controls and mechanisms is non-trivial. 
 
 
Figure 4: Largest Single Denial of Service Attack (Arbor Networks, 2010, p5). 
 
In summary, the difficulties in guaranteeing cloud service security were discussed and a case study which 
highlighted some of the likely problems to be encountered in the hosting of medical data was put forward.  
Ultimately, it may be that experience in secure development as applied to the domain of cloud computing is the 
key determinant of the success of any remote hosting and transfer of any medical information. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
This study explored the problems of using a nascent technology, cloud computing, to store medical data.  The 
complex nature of cloud services was revealed and a case study that described the implementation of an iPad 
app that transferred medical data was articulated and discussed. 
Specifically, this study used a case study to show how a medical data could be generated, stored and shared 
using cloud computing.  It was argued that cloud services provided benefits in that the cloud façade hid the 
complexity of data transfer and storage from the end-user, as compared to conventional database or file-based 
storage techniques.  It was shown that the cloud could inadvertently be responsible for security breaches under 
certain circumstances. 
A limitation of this work is that it used only a single case study with a specific cloud platform, therefore it 
would be unwise to conclude that all cloud platforms or deployment models suffer from identical security 
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problems.  Further work would involve extending this idea to see how well other cloud providers dealt with the 
security issues outlined in this paper. 
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